Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
Federalism and Decentralization -A Critical Survey of Frequently Used Indicators 1 Introduction
Political scientists but also political and institutional economists have become interested in estimating the economic effects of federalism. Surveys of the emerging literature such as Feld et al. (2004) indicate that the evidence is clearly unclear. We argue that the ambiguity in these results is at least partially due to the indicators used to proxy for federalism: Frequently, no clear-cut distinction between decentralization and federalism is made. Quite often, the existence of federalism is proxied for with a dummy variable, by necessity neglecting many institutional details and differences between the various states counted as federations.
The distinction between federalism and decentralization is particularly relevant if one is interested in the economic effects of constitutions. Glaeser et al. (2004) point out that many studies purporting to measure the economic effects of institutions really only measure the economic effects of policy choices. We argue that many measures of decentralization or devolution can be interpreted as measures of policy choices -and not constitutional ones. It is, hence, argued that federations are a consequence of constitutional choice, whereas decentralization is a consequence of policy choice. Framed as a hypothesis: Federally constituted states can be highly centralized and states constituted in a unitary fashion can be highly decentralized.
Not all federations are alike. Some are described as cooperative and others as competitive. If one is interested in the economic consequences of federalism, it might, hence, be useful to be more specific and to indicate the precise institution that is to have an impact on economic variables.
In this paper we ask whether the conceptual distinction between federalism and decentralization is reflected in the data. To answer the question, we run factor analysis drawing on 25 indicators that have been used as variables for both federalism and decentralization. We find more than one latent factor implying that federalism and decentralization can also be distinguished empirically. We find even more than two latent constructs indicating that the distinction between federalism and decentralization might still be too coarse. Seven aspects of federalism and decentralization can be separated from each other: token executive elections, sub-national expenditure, fiscal independence, sub-national democracy, federal veto, federal competence and composition of parliament. 2 Empirically, they can be found in various combinations. Further, proxies for both federalism and decentralization are correlated with a number of geographical, socioeconomic and institutional variables. Correlations with potential determinants of federalism as well as other institutions like judicial independence are normally modest which leads us to speculate that the various proxies for federalism and decentralization are rather exogenous. 3 The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 delivers a number of theoretical arguments in favor of a distinction between federally constituted states on the one hand and unitary states that have decentralized some of their functions on the other. Section 3 presents and critically evaluates some of the indicators that have been used as proxies for both federalism and decentralization. Section 4 contains the description of the factor analysis and offers a number of possible interpretations of the resulting factors. Section 5 concludes.
Federation vs. Decentralization
Definitions can only be adequate or inadequate; they cannot be true or false. If one is interested in the effects of institutions in general or constitutions more specifically, one needs to take care to measure institutions (or constitutional rules) -and not something else. Glaeser et al. (2004) criticize studies purporting to find evidence in favor of the claim that institutions matter for not measuring institutions, but rather policies. This is why we propose to make a distinction between federalism (or federations) and decentralization (or devolution). A number of empirical studies suggest that this distinction could be relevant with regard to economic consequences. Treisman (2000) , for example, finds that federal states have higher corruption levels than unitary states, ceteris paribus. Fisman and Gatti (2002) , on the other hand, find that fiscal decentralization is strongly and significantly associated with lower corruption levels. These results only seem contradictory: Treisman relies on a dummy variable for federal states 2
The new factors are used as explanatory variables in a companion paper (Voigt and Blume 2008) that also contains an explicit theoretical section in which the potential effects of federal structures on a number of economically relevant variables are explicitly described. 3 Correlations with economic variables vary depending on the variables chosen to measure economic effects, e.g. happiness, output per worker or government expenditure. This is relevant for our companion paper (Voigt and Blume 2008) , in which we estimate the economic effects of federalism and decentralisation.
whereas Fisman and Gatti really deal with fiscal decentralization which they proxy for by the share of subnational spending over total government spending. Freille (2006) comes up with the intriguing finding that both fiscal decentralization and constitutional centralization (i.e. unitarism) are simultaneously associated with lower corruption. It therefore seems to matter a great deal whether one is interested in the effects of federalism or the effects of decentralized provision of public goods.
Before making a number of theoretical arguments in favor of a distinction between federalism and decentralization, we propose to disentangle the "federalism" concept from the concept "constitutional democracy". Stepan (2001, 318) argues that it only makes sense to speak of federations if they are constitutional democracies. In constructing measures of federalism, some others have followed suit (Gerring et al. 2006) . We beg to differ: If the dichotomy between unitarism and federalism primarily deals with the allocation of government power to either one center (unitarism) or a number of centers (federalism), then the question whether the various legislators have been elected in contested elections or in some other way is a different issue. There is no logically necessary connection between the allocation of government power and the way the governing are elected. Separating the two concepts enables us to identify the consequences of different institutions (constitutional democracy or federalism) with greater precision since we will be able to separate effects of democratic elections from effects that are due to the allocation of government powers.
In defining federalism, we follow Riker (1975, 101) : "Federalism is a political organization in which the activities of government are divided between regional governments and a central government in such a way that each kind of government has some activities on which it makes final decisions." Federations thus consist of constituent governments (the regional governments) and one central government and both levels of government are endowed with final decision-making power in some areas. As we are interested in constitutional provisions, we would like to add that at least one area of final decision-making should be explicitly mentioned in the constitution for both the regional governments and the central government. Further, this allocation of decisionmaking competence can only be expected to be stable over time if it cannot be changed by either the central government or the regional governments unilaterally. In other words: constitutional change requires the consent of both levels of government. Riker himself (ibid., 102) points out that his definition leaves ample room for variation within the group of federally constituted states: at minimum, the rulers of the federation can make decisions in only one narrowly restricted area, at maximum, they can make decisions in all but one area. Ideally, indicators of federalism ought to reflect these differences.
States set up in a unitary fashion are the opposite of federally organized states: there is only one level of government with final decision making power.
Constitutional change can be brought about if the only level of government manages to organize the necessary majority. The dichotomy between federally vs. unitarily organized states is thus to do with the allocation of fundamental competences.
Both federal as well as unitary states can decentralize -or centralize -some activities. But in unitary states, the decision to decentralize can be revoked if the central government so wishes. This shows that even after decentralization, ultimate decision-making power remains with the central government level. The two terms federation and decentralization deal, hence, with different levels of decision making: Federation refers to a trait in the constitutional level whereas the term decentralization describes a policy choice on the post-constitutional one. 4
This implies that a federal structure can be used to implement a decentralization policy, the two are thus not mutually exclusive. But it also means that a federal structure is NOT a necessary condition to implement decentralization policies as these can also be implemented under unitary constitutions. 5
Ex ante, we should expect a number of decentralization indicators (such as the share of subnational government spending over total government spending) to be more stable over time in federally constituted states than in unitary states because constitutions are assumed to be stable over time whereas policy choices primarily depend on the preferences of the current government. 6 If we were to observe high volatility in such indicators although the country has a federal constitution, we might suspect that the factually implemented constitution is not equivalent with the de jure constitution. The distinction between constitutional vs. post-constitutional choice is fundamental in constitutional political economy (see, e.g., Buchanan 1975). 5 We are not the first to emphasize the difference between federalism and decentralization. Authors that have previously stressed the distinction include Diamond (1969) and Elazar (1976) . Sturm (2002) contains an instructive table comparing federalism with devolution in a number of dimensions, which we present here in a somewhat modified form.
In order to safe space, we refrain from discussing any details. 
Taking Stock: Available Indicators for Federalism and Decentralization
The main question of this paper is whether the conceptual distinction between federalism and decentralization is reflected in the data. As a first step in answering this question, we take a critical look at all readily available indicators of both federalism and decentralization. As a second step, we run a factor analysis in search of common (latent) factors that hide behind the various indicators of both federalism and decentralization. The factor analysis itself is described in section four. And our third step consists in analyzing the bivariate correlations of the factors with other institutional variables.
This section serves to present as well as to critically discuss the most frequently used indicators. We will not only ask whether the respective indicator under consideration reflects constitutionally safeguarded rules (as opposed to mere policy choices) but also whether it takes into account whether and possibly to what degree the constitutionally mandated rules are factually implemented. This last distinction appears important as economic effects will only show as a consequence of factually implemented institutions. Unfortunately, this makes the distinction between the constitutional and the post-constitutional level less clearcut, as post-constitutional choices could also be a proxy for the factual implementation of constitutional rules. 7
Decentralization Indicators
We begin by a short overview over the most frequently used decentralization indicators and propose to distinguish (1) fiscal from (2) political and (3) administrative decentralization.
Fiscal Decentralization Indicators
Fiscal decentralization is concerned with the proportion of revenues and expenditures received and spent by subnational government tiers. Most empirical studies on decentralization rely on the ratio between subnational and total revenues or subnational and total expenditures. These are presented in the IMF's Government Finance Statistics Yearbooks. We rely on four such variables: (1) FISCDEC 1 which reflects the sub-national share of total expenditure, (2) FISCDEC 2 reflects the sub-national grants share as a percentage of total subnational revenues, (3) FISCDEC 3 which is a proxy for vertical imbalance reflecting the transfers to sub-national governments as a share of sub-national government expenditures and (4) FISCDEC 4 which depicts the sub-national own-source revenues as a percentage of total own-source revenues.
These indicators reflect the de facto situation with regard to the various shares focused on. Yet, they are subject to a number of criticisms: (i) Governments need not necessarily spend money to induce effects; many regulatory policies are virtually "costless" in terms of the money spent by governments; expenditure shares do, hence, not adequately reflect the political importance of a government tier. (ii) The proportion between money spent on the subnational to the national level does not contain any information regarding the efficiency with which money is being spent. (iii) The proportion does not contain any information on the autonomy that the subnational tiers dispose of in collecting or spending that money. Correspondingly, the information contained in these indicators is limited. 
Political Decentralization Indicators
The Database of Political Institutions provided by the World Bank (Beck et al. 2000) contains five indicators that are supposed to proxy for "federalism". We prefer to present the indicators as proxies for the degree of political decentralization because they do not conform with our federalism definition (as they do not depend on the existence of constitutionally secured units having some ultimate decision-making power and the power to veto constitutional change). The aspects of decentralization thus accounted for can, hence, also be found in states with a unitary constitution. Here are the five variables: (i) AUTON asks whether 8 Due to the low number of countries for which this indicator has been coded, we refrain from including it in the factor analysis in the next section.
contiguous autonomous regions exist 9 , (ii) MUNI documents whether municipal legislatures and governments are locally elected, (iii) STATE applies the same criteria to state governments, (iv) AUTHOR is coded one if the states have authority over taxing or spending or legislating, and (v) STCONST asks whether the constituencies of the upper house members are the states or the provinces.
The variables AUTHOR and STCONST seem to be closest to a federalism dummy. Yet, AUTHOR is a very coarse measure as it refers to taxing or spending or legislating. As none of these competences needs to be mentioned in the constitution, it cannot be used as an indicator for federalism. This also holds with regard to STCONST.
Christine Kearney's (1999) decentralization indicator contains two variables that focus on one aspect of the MUNI and STATE variables produced by Beck et al. (2000) : Her LOCEXE and REGEXE indicators show whether local or regional executives (but not legislatures) are directly or indirectly elected. Rodden (2004, 487) interprets the local election of both municipal and state governments as political decentralization and constructs a combined indicator out of LOCEXE and REGEXE.
The focus of these two variables clearly is on democratic legitimacy of the lower government tiers and not on their competences. They certainly do not reflect any aspect of federalism as defined above.
Structural / Administrative Decentralization
Treisman (2002) The DPI codebook stresses that autonomous regions are not the same as states or provinces. In order to be coded as "1" here, the constitution needs to mention these regions as "autonomous", "independent" or "special". Prima facie, this indicator bears little relationship with federalism.
Federalism Indicators
We now move on to the discussion of the federalism indicators. We begin by a short overview over a number of dummy variables that have been used frequently.
A number of recent extensions (e.g. provision of time-series data) are added.
Then, variables dealing with constitutionally safeguarded competences occupy center stage. The third group of indicators deals with one specific aspect, namely fiscal rules fixed in the constitution. Finishing our presentation of federalism indicators, some proxies capturing the role of parties are presented.
Federalism Dummies
Most studies interested in the economic effects of federalism (and not in the effects of decentralization) have relied on dummy variables. The federation dummy proposed by Daniel Elazar (1991 Elazar ( , 1995 is based on Riker's (1964) definition of federalism; it has been used by many scholars. Dummy variables have also been proposed by a number of other authors including Kearney (1999), Watts (1999) , and Derbyshire and Derbyshire (1999) but not thereafter).
10
The dummy is the answer to the question: "Does the country have a federal constitution?" Her codebook does not specify any criteria. indeed, have to conclude that they are unitary. That the factual division of power has led some observers to classify these states as federal points at a potential problem of de facto classifications: the discretion in coding is higher than with regard to de jure classifications.
Constitutionally Assigned Competences
Moving on to the delineation of competences between the various levels of government described in the constitution, we begin by an important allocation decision. By necessity, all constitutions are incomplete. The decision whether the federal government or the constituent governments have the authority to provide a public good not explicitly mentioned by the constitution seems to be an important one: is it the constituent governments that have residual authority -or is it the federal government? Treisman (2002) federal in 1980 and 1985 (in 1995 in the case of Uganda), the national government did NOT dispose of the competence to override! It seems important to keep in mind that these codings reflect the de jure situation which is not necessarily identical with the de facto situation. Additionally, Kearney looked for "legal rights" of the central government which does not necessarily mean "constitutional rights".
The last indicator to be presented in this section deals with the competence of the constituent units to block (certain kinds of non-financial) legislation. It has also been constructed by Treisman (2002) and is called SUBVETO here. On the one hand, the power to block legislation could be interpreted as one of the cardinal issues of many factually realized federations. Often, both levels need to agree if one level wants to legislate. This has come to be called "gridlock" but could also be viewed as a specific form of cooperative (or non-competitive) federalism. On the other hand, giving the constituent units a say in some important decisions is a necessary condition if it refers to constitutional change.
Constitutionally Assigned Fiscal Competence
The indicators discussed in the last subsection dealt with constitutionally assigned competences in general. We now move on to discuss a specific group of competences, namely fiscal competences. These are of particular interest as the discussion of potential effects of federal structures has concentrated on fiscal rules. The variables discussed here do not deal with fiscal policy outcomes (share of subnational expenditures or revenues) but with fiscal competences.
Kearney (1999) presents a variable describing whether sub-national governments have the formal authority to raise their own revenues via taxation. In order to be coded accordingly, sub-national governments need to have both the right to set the base as well as the right to set the rate. Kearney (1999) The spending autonomy of the lower government levels can also be secured if they have a right to a portion of the revenues accruing on the national level and if these are transferred to them in a regular and unconditional fashion. This is captured by the variable REVSHARE also produced by Kearney (1999) . On the one hand, REVSHARE is indeed an indicator for the autonomy of sub-national government tiers. On the other, such rules create incentives for lower government tiers to have specific interests in the federal tax rates. Such institutional provisions thus may induce a cooperative kind of federalism.
Another way besides taxes and grants to raise revenue is to borrow money.
Following an approach first developed by the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB 1997), Rodden (2002) constructs a borrowing autonomy index that is based on six different aspects, namely the ability of subnational governments to borrow, whether they need authorization from the central government, whether there are any borrowing constraints and whether debt may not be used for certain expenditures. In addition, the index takes into account whether subnational governments own banks and also whether they own important public enterprises (AUTOBORROW). High scores in this index show that the subnational governments can act independently from the national government. 11
Other Potentially Relevant Facts Riker (1964 Riker ( , 1975 proposed an entirely different take on ascertaining the realized degree of federalism. He distinguishes between fully centralized federalism and partially centralized federalism and observes (1975, 133) : "In all the fully centralized federations, the political party system is also fully centralized … In all the partially centralized federations the political party system is relatively decentralized." The implication of this observation is that federalism can be measured by measuring the party system. Riker himself made a number of proposals how this could be done (1957, 1964) . He relies on two indicators (1975, 137) : (1) whether the party that controls the national government also controls the constituent governments and (2) whether party discipline exists on both legislative 11 In the literature on fiscal federalism, the credibility of the national government's claims not to bail out subnational governments should they need this is intensely debated. Here, we refrain from entering this debate but just mention that a high degree of borrowing autonomy can become an important problem if the central government cannot credibly commit to non-bail out policies. and executive matters. He is quick in adding a number of problems, e.g., that the concept of party discipline has a different meaning in a two party system than in a multiparty system. Rodden and Wibbels (2002) picked up on this and constructed an indicator reflecting the percentage of state governments controlled by the party of the federal chief executive (COPARTISAN). They generated the variable for 15 federations on an annual basis for the period from 1978 until 1996. In most countries, within-country variation is quite high, shedding doubt on the conjecture that the centralization of parties is a good proxy for the degree of centralization.
The only two countries with a stable (and very high) proportion of federalprovincial copartisanship are Malaysia and Mexico. Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2006) have recently used three variables contained in the Database of Political Institutions as proxies for party strength: PARTYAGE reflects the average age of the first and second government parties and the first opposition party. The rationale behind this is that age is supposed to be an indicator for both strength and stability of the party system. The stability is, in turn, an important factor for decisions concerning political careers. GOVFRAC reflects the probability that two deputies picked at random from among the government parties will be of different parties. The lower this value, the stronger the governing party is supposed to be. A slightly different proxy for the strength of parties is total fractionalization among all legislators (FRAC). 
Identifying Latent Variables via Factor Analysis
The sheer number of proxies for both fiscal decentralization and federalism shortly surveyed in section 3 makes it difficult to keep a clear head. In order to test whether some latent variables behind the proxies can be identified, we draw on factor analysis. Here is an overview over the contents of the tables in this section: Table 4 contains the eigenvalues and table 5 the factor loadings. On basis of these tables we discuss the factor loadings of the first seven principal components and assign some short labels to them. 12 Table 6 shows the correlations between the seven original variables with the highest loadings on the components as well as the correlations of these seven variables with a dummy variable for federalism which is constructed as the median of the six most frequently used dummies for federalism. Table 7 shows bivariate correlations between the derived components and other country characteristics like possible determinants of federalism, other institutional country characteristics and socio-economic outcome variables.
12
The two subsequent components not documented in table 5 have an Eigenvalue of < 1 and could be interpreted as proxying for "autonomous region" and "number of administrative units". (namely whether local and regional governments are elected) with the competence of the center to override decisions of the lower government tiers. It seems that this component does not fit our priors regarding fiscal decentralization or federalism.
It could even fit a democratic, but unitary state. We propose to call this factor token executive elections. The second component is primarily composed of the sub-national share of total expenditure and the sub-national revenues out of own resources. This covers one important aspect of fiscal decentralization. We propose to call it "sub-national expenditure". The third component is closely related to this: it centers around vertical transfers and we propose to call it "fiscal independence". The fourth component is related to the first one: this one primarily deals with democratic elections on the sub-national levels; it also includes the variable on the age of parties, thus also reflecting local democracy, rather than either fiscal decentralization or federalism as defined above. Remember that we argued in the theoretical section that it is possible to separate federalism from democracy, at least conceptually. Actually, the resulting components re-enforce this view: components one and four deal with local democracy. Components two and three deal with fiscal issues.
Two of the three remaining components deal with important aspects of federalism as described in section 2. Component five is driven by two constitutional variables, namely the competence of the subnational levels to veto national legislation or to veto national legislation regarding finance issues. We propose to call it "federal veto". The next component also deals with some core aspects of federalism, namely the question whether the states have some residual autonomy.
But in addition, it also reflects some important fiscal aspects that we would expect federations to have. We propose to call it "federal competence". The seventh, and last component, deals with the composition of parliament. It thus deals, again, with an aspect of democracy, here not on the institutional level but rather on the policy level.
Summing up, we have identified seven components, three of which deal primarily with democracy, (1, 4 and 7), two deal with fiscal decentralization issues (2 and 3) and only two with federalism as defined above. If one uses the seven variables with the highest factor loadings on the derived principal components (as representatives of these components) and looks at the resulting bivariate correlations, then one notices that not a single correlation is larger than .4. Although a number of correlations are significant, this indicates that the seven variables reflect seven dimensions of both federalism and decentralization that are largely independent from each other.
Moreover, table 6 shows that the most frequently used federalism dummies reflect three of the seven dimensions in particular, namely fiscal decentralization, veto powers of subnational units in national legislation and revenue autonomy. The first of these three would conceptually rather belong to decentralization.
Our main conclusion is that more fine-grained indicators of federalism should aim at keeping conceptually different dimensions such as revenue autonomy and constitutional veto powers apart. 
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'**' and '*' show that the Bravais Pearson correlation is significant on the 1 or 5 percent level respectively.
Although attempts to endogenize federalism date back at least to Riker who argued that external threats were instrumental in the founding of federations, it seems fair to say that the determinants of federalism are still largely unclear. Since the central focus of this paper is the analysis of various indicators, we will not attempt to contribute anything here. Nevertheless, it might be interesting to have a look at a number of potentially relevant determinants and their correlations with our seven components. Lines 1-11 in table 7 reflect potential determinants of federalism. The first two refer to the size of a country, the idea being that the larger a country -either in terms of population or area -the more necessary might autonomous subnational government units be. The next four lines simply show whether the seven components are more (or less) frequently observed in various geographic regions. The most striking results are the negative correlations between a number of federalism/decentralization variables in Sub-Saharan Africa.
OECD membership is not based on geography but rather on wealth. A number of variables are significantly positively correlated with OECD membership.
Fractionalization, be it ethnic, linguistic or religious, is conjectured to be an important determinant of federalism. Empirically, if anything, the opposite seems to be the case as the many negative correlations in the respective lines indicate.
Income distribution can also be interpreted as a sort of fractionalization. Here, too, higher values of the Gini-coefficient are negatively correlated with a number of federalism /decentralization variables. Finally, the age of the current regime could be correlated with our variables, if there are fads and fashions, i.e. if the time of choosing basic institutions is a determinant. The number of years a country has been democratic without interruption is indeed correlated with fiscal decentralization and the local election of municipal legislatures and executives.
The overall message is that the degree of both federalism and decentralization seems to be largely independent from the variables just discussed. As already mentioned, a different picture emerges when analyzing the correlation between the level of democracy (line 12 in table 7). In particular our component muni is highly correlated with the observed level of democracy.
In lines 13-15 of table 7, we move on to present a number of correlations between our federalism/decentralization indicators and other institutional aspects. Partial correlations are also very low with the exception of some correlations with de facto judicial independence. In lines 16-22 we show correlations with variables that represent different socio-economic outcomes like government expenditures (totexp), government efficiency (govef), output per worker (logyl) and happiness.
The overall message of these correlations is that the bivariate correlations are neither high or low across all seven components looked at but depend on the specific variables under consideration. But these bivariate correlations should not be overinterpreted: causality can definitely not be inferred from them.
Conclusion and Outlook
This paper started with the conjecture that federalism and decentralization are two different concepts that better be kept apart both theoretically and empirically. In order to test whether the most frequently used indicators for both federalism and decentralization can be synthesized into a single latent variable, 25 variables were fed into a principal component analysis. The results show that not even two components are sufficient to capture the various dimensions of the two concepts. Empirically, seven components could be separated which we labeled token executive elections, sub-national expenditure, fiscal independence, sub-national democracy, federal veto, federal competence and composition of parliament.
The data-analysis carried out in this paper therefore shows that we are in need of more adequate and fine-grained indicators for both federalism and decentralization. It would be particularly helpful to have indicators that explicitly make a distinction between de jure constitutional rules and their de facto implementation. Not only would this enable us to make more sense of the variation in outcomes observed within the group of federally organized states but this could also be used to pursue the question under what conditions de jure constitutional rules can be expected to be factually enforced.
As the number of federally organized states is rather small, only around two dozen, it would also be helpful to construct time-series data in order to have more observations.
